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Introduction 
Half a decade has passed since the resurgence of international capital flows 
to many developing countries. About $670 billion of foreign capital has flowed to 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America in the five years from 1990-94, as 
measured by the total balance on the capital account of these countries. This is about five 
times the $133 billion total of the previous five years, when there was a debt crisis and 
many of these countries had little or no access to international capital markets. Although 
there was a substantial decline in capital flows to developing countries in the immediate 
aftermath of Mexico's currency crisis in December 1994, in most cases capital inflows 
have resumed and by mid-1995 have been sustained at relatively high levels. 
The recent surge in capital inflows was initially attributed to domestic 
developments, such as the sound policies and stronger economic performance of a 
handful of countries. Eventually, it became clear that the phenomenon was widespread, 
affecting countries with very diverse characteristics. This pattern suggested that global 
factors, like cyclical movements in interest rates, were especially important. Moreover, 
the pattern reflected a growing trend toward integration of world capital markets and 
globalization of investments. 
Capital flows from rich to poor countries are worth studying for a number of 
reasons. Foreign capital can finance investment and stimulate economic growth, thus 
helping increase the standard of living in the developing world. Capital flows can 
increase welfare by enabling households to smooth out their consumption over 
time and achieve higher levels of consumption. Capital flows can help developed 
countries achieve a better international diversification of their portfolios and also 
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provide support for pension funds and retirement accounts into the twenty-first 
century. However, large capital inflows can also have less desirable macroeconomic 
effects, including rapid monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange 
rate appreciation and widening current account deficits. Hence, a surge in inflows 
of the magnitudes seen in recent years may pose serious dilemmas and tradeoffs 
for economic policy, especially in the present environment of high capital mobility. 
History has also shown that the global factors affecting foreign investment tend 
to have an important cyclical component, which has given rise to repeated booms 
and busts in capital inflows. 1 For example, in Latin America, marked episodes of 
capital inflows during the 1920s and 1978-1981 were followed by major economic 
crises and capital outflows, such as in the 1930s and in the mid-1980s. The Mexican 
balance-of-payments crisis of December 1994 is but a recent example of this 
phenomenon and highlights the vulnerability of developing capital-importing countries 
to abrupt reversals; thus, an aim of policy is to reduce that vulnerability. 
This paper discusses the principal facts, developments and policies that 
characterize the current episode of capital inflows to Asia and Latin America. Figure 1 
presents evidence on the patterns and magnitude of the flows to these two regions, 
while Table 1 presents some basic information about the major economies of Asia 
and Latin America that are most relevant to our discussion, including the approximate 
date of the surge in capital inflows, per capita GDP and the size of the capital 
inflows, as measured by the balance on the capital account as a percentage of GDP 
from the beginning of the inflow episode through 1994. If the country has enacted 
                                                 
1 Diaz-Alejandro (1983) and Eichengreen (1991) stress the important role played by developments in the 
major financial centers in affecting the pattern of lending to developing countries. 
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a major inflation stabilization plan, the date when it began is given at the bottom 
of the table. We begin by discussing the determinants of capital flows to developing 
countries, with emphasis on the causes behind the heavy inflow of the 1990s. We 
then discuss the macroeconomic effects of the inflows and whether a policy response 
might be useful. The final section draws some policy lessons from the recent experiences 
and discusses areas for future research. 
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Causes of the Capital Inflows 
The factors that encourage or hinder international flows of capital can be 
categorized into those that are external to the economies receiving the flow and 
the factors internal to those economies. Several of these factors and trends interacted 
in the early 1990s to make the developing countries of Latin America and Asia fertile 
territory for the renewal of foreign lending. 
First, there was a sustained decline in world interest rates. For example, short-
term 
interest rates in the United States were declining steadily in the early 1990s, and by late 
1992 they were at their lowest level since the early 1960s. Lower interest rates in the 
developed nations attracted investors to the high-investment yields and improving 
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economic prospects of economies in Asia and Latin America. Given the high external 
debt burden of many of these countries, low world interest rates also appear to have 
improved the creditworthiness of debtor countries that borrow at these rates (Fernandez-
Arias, 1993). The improved creditworthiness and reduced default risk is reflected in the 
marked rise in secondary market prices of bank claims on most of the heavily indebted 
countries through February 1994; Figure 2 illustrates the connection. While this turn of 
events was heralded as good news in most developing countries, policymakers there 
during the early 1990s became concerned about the sustainability of this favorable 
interest rate environment.  Surely enough, the tightening of monetary policy in the United 
States and the resulting rise in interest rates in early 1994 made investment in Asia and 
Latin America relatively less attractive. As shown in Figure 2, higher interest rates 
quickly and markedly affected developing country debt prices. Indeed, the rise in U.S. 
rates also triggered marked corrections in several emerging stock markets. It seems likely 
that with highly integrated and technologically sophisticated financial markets, changes 
in relative rates of return will quickly translate into changes in cross-border capital flows. 
Also, a growing proportion of investment in Latin America and Asia is "portfolio equity," 
which refers to financial investments in companies that can easily be altered or 
withdrawn with little more than the flick of a computer key. 
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Second, the early 1990s brought recessions to the United States, .Japan and 
many countries of Europe. This swing of the international business cycle doubtless 
made profit opportunities in developing countries appear relatively more attractive. 
However, as the OECD economies move toward recovery in the mid-1990s, this 
factor will become less important in generating capital flows to Latin America and 
Asia. 
Third, there has been a trend toward international diversification of investments 
in major financial centers and toward growing integration of world capital 
markets (Gooptu, 1993). Increasing amounts of funds managed by life insurance 
companies and mutual funds have entered emerging markets. Regulatory changes 
in the United States and Europe have also made it easier for foreign firms to place 
their equity and bonds under more attractive conditions to investors (El-Erian, 
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1992). 
Fourth, many heavily indebted countries made significant progress toward 
improving relations with external creditors. Other domestic policies that could be 
added to this list include the role played by debt equity swaps in encouraging foreign 
direct investment (Edwards, 1991). 
Fifth, several countries began to adopt sound monetary and fiscal policies as 
well as market-oriented reforms that has included trade and capital market liberalization. 
For example, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico implemented major disinflation 
programs in the late 1980s, while Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru have done 
so during the early 1990s. An effective inflation stabilization program can reduce 
macroeconomic risks and stimulate capital inflows. 2 A similar outcome could result 
from the introduction of institutional reforms, such as the liberalization of the 
domestic capital market (Obstfeld, 1986) and the opening of the trade account 
(Calvo, 1988), and policies that result in credible increases in the rate of return on 
investment (such as tax credits). 
Finally, a large shift in capital flows to one or two large countries in a region 
may generate externalities for the smaller neighboring countries. These are the so-called 
contagion effects. For example, it could be argued that Mexico's and Chile's 
reentry into international capital markets in 1990 made investors more familiar 
                                                 
2 Over a time horizon of the early 1990s, this effect does not necessarily depend on the credibility of these 
stabilization programs. As the experience of various Latin American countries in the late 1970s shows, 
domestic policies may also attract speculative capital when policies are not fully credible. Often the partial 
credibility of these policies leads to relatively high returns on short-term assets, which attract foreign 
capital on grounds of intertemporal speculation. 
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and more willing to invest in other emerging markets in Latin America. Indeed, 
the more recent events suggest that the Mexican crisis of late 1994 tended to make 
the attitude of investors toward emerging markets more discriminating. 
Within this mix of external and domestic factors, it seems likely that the external 
factors have been quite important in the first half of the 1990s. Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart (1993) examine empirical evidence for 10 Latin American 
countries and find that foreign factors accounted for 30 to 60 percent of the 
variance in real exchange rates and reserves (two variables that directly reflect 
developments in the capital account), depending on the country. Chuhan, Claessens 
and Mamingi (1993) find that external variables explain about half of the bond 
and equity flows from the United States to a panel of six Latin American countries; 
for Asia, they conclude that external factors account for about one-third of bond 
and equity flows into the region. 
While this discussion has stressed external developments, domestic factors also 
remain important in both the magnitude and the composition of inflows. Countries 
with sound domestic fundamentals attracted capital on a larger scale and with a 
higher proportion of long-term investment. As the cross-country evidence presented 
in Edwards (1991) shows, there appears to be a strong link between economic 
fundamentals and foreign direct investment. An earlier literature on capital 
flight also documented this link (Dooley, 1988). 
 
Macroeconomic Effects 
We now turn to the macroeconomic effects of the renewal of foreign lending 
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to developing countries. This section describes the basic facts that capture some of 
the most important aspects of the experience of the largest recipients of capital 
inflows in Asia and Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand. Of course, this list of facts 
is meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. 3 
First, a substantial portion of the surge in capital inflows has been channeled 
to accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. From 1990 to 1994, the share going 
to reserves has been 59 percent in Asia and 35 percent in Latin America. These two 
regions have accumulated about $209 billion in international reserves over the last 
five years. Three of the largest capital recipient-Brazil, Malaysia and Thailand account 
for more than one-third of the total (Table 2). More recently, the pace of 
reserve accumulation is showing some signs of slowing, and an increasing portion 
of the capital inflows is taking the form of larger current account deficits. This shift 
was particularly pronounced in Mexico in 1993 and even more so in 1994, when 
large reserve losses were recorded. 
                                                 
3 The experience of a broader set of Asian and Latin American countries is reviewed in Calvo, Leiderman, 
and Reinhart (1993, 1994a, b). The list of capital-inflow countries also includes large economies such as 
India and the People's Republic of China. 
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Second, in most countries the capital inflows have been associated with widening 
current account deficits. Countries such as Brazil and Chile, which have more 
modest current account deficits, had recorded surpluses prior to the surge in inflows. 
This widening of the current account has usually involved both an increase in national 
investment and a fall in national saving (of course, the gap between the 
two is the current account deficit). Investment ratios have risen in most of these 
countries between 1990 and 1994, while the rate of saving has declined in half of 
the countries considered (Calvo, Leiderrnan and Reinhart, 1994a). Some years ago, 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that national savings and investment tended 
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to be highly correlated, which they took as evidence that global capital markets 
were not yet well developed enough to loosen the linkage between a country's 
savings and its investment.  However, the recent behavior of saving and investment 
in many of these developing countries implies that these capital markets have become 
increasingly integrated over the years. Not unexpectedly, high investment 
and consumption are reflected in higher growth rates for real GDP, as shown in 
the fourth column of Table 2. Although it is consistent with the observations made by 
Frankel (1993a) that the correlations have been declining in the more recent period and 
by Montiel (1993), who notes that the correlations appear to be lower for developing 
countries. 
Third, as one would expect from the fall in national saving, there has been a 
rise in private consumption spending. While disaggregated data on consumption 
are not available for most of the developing countries, the import data suggests the 
consumption boom is heavily driven by rising imports of durable goods. This has 
been particularly true in the Latin American experience including Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico. 
Fourth, in almost all the countries examined there is rapid growth in the money 
supply in both nominal and real terms, as shown in the last column of Table 2. 
This follows, logically enough, from the acceleration in economic activity observed 
in the receiving countries and, in some instances-including Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and the Philippines-from a reduction in the opportunity cost of 
holding money, as domestic inflation was reduced. However, several countries have 
demonstrated that it was possible, even in the face of large capital inflows (at least 
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in the short run), for the central bank to curb the acceleration in the growth of 
the money supply. The central bank can do this in two ways. First, it can refrain 
from intervening in the foreign exchange market and simply allow the domestic 
currency to appreciate in response to the increased demand for domestic assets. In 
that case no international reserves are accumulated and no expansion in the monetary 
base ensues. Alternatively, it can issue domestic bonds to provide for all or 
most the foreign exchange purchases; that is, the expansionary effect on the monetary 
base of an increase in central bank holdings of foreign exchange reserves is 
offset by a reduction in domestic liquidity. Such action by a central bank is referred 
to as "sterilized intervention." In fact, the cross-country differences in changes in 
the money supply are largely due to the differences in the degree of sterilization 
of the capital inflows and the extent to which the authorities were willing to allow 
a nominal exchange rate appreciation. 
Fifth, the surge in portfolio flows to the Asian and Latin American countries 
was accompanied by sharp increases in stock and real estate prices. Share prices for 
many emerging markets were sharply higher in U.S. dollar terms at the end of 1993 
than at the outset of the inflows episode. For example, during 1991, Argentina 
posted an annual dollar return of 400 percent, while Chile and Mexico offered 
returns of about 100 percent. 
Sixth, the evidence on the behavior of the real exchange rate presents a mixed 
picture. As Table 2 shows, in most Latin American countries, capital inflows have 
been associated with a marked real exchange rate appreciation. 4 In Asia, such an 
                                                 
4 Although there has been a real appreciation in Latin America, it seems that monetary authorities have 
been reluctant to allow a nominal appreciation. 
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appreciation is only evident in the Philippines; for the remaining Asian countries 
in Table 2, the real exchange rate remained surprisingly stable through the inflow 
period. Here again, domestic policies may reinforce external developments. Consumption 
booms are a regular feature of exchange rate-based stabilization programs, including the 
recent Mexican plan (Reinhart and Vegh, 1994).  
Although many reasons surely contribute to these differences in change of the real 
exchange rate, the composition of aggregate demand may play a key explanatory role. In 
the Asian economies, investment as a share of GDP increased considerably more during 
the capital inflows period than in most Latin American countries. In Latin America, the 
capital inflows have primarily been associated with a decline in private saving and higher 
consumption, particularly during the initial stages of the surge in 1990 and 1991. If 
investment is tilted more toward imported capital goods and consumption has a higher 
domestic component, other things equal, this would work in the direction of generating a 
stronger real exchange rate appreciation in Latin America. The behavior of public-sector 
consumption may also be influencing the real exchange rate: the greater the contraction 
in fiscal expenditure at the time of capital inflows, the weaker the extent of real exchange 
rate appreciation. Although several Latin American countries have had major fiscal 
adjustment programs, like Chile and Mexico, these mainly predated the surge in 
capital inflows. In contrast, the spending contractions in several Asian economies, 
most markedly in Thailand during 1988-1991, occurred at the time of the inflows 
(Schadler et al., 1993). 
In addition, most of the countries that experienced a substantial real exchange 
rate appreciation had ongoing inflation stabilization plans during the inflow period. 
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Some plans, such as Argentina's Convertibility Plan, Brazil's Real Plan and the 
Mexican plan, used the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. Such appreciations 
are a well-established empirical regularity of exchange rate-based inflation stabilization 
plans (Reinhart and Vegh, 1994). 
 
Modeling the Capital Inflows 
These six effects of capital inflows on other key economic variables are not 
unexpected; in fact, they can readily be derived from standard open economy 
models. 
Begin by considering an intertemporal model of consumption and saving in an 
open economy with capital mobility, in the tradition of Irving Fisher. In the simplest 
version of such a model, a representative consumer with perfect foresight chooses 
sequences of consumption of a traded good and a nontraded good to maximize utility 
over time. Of course, future consumption must be appropriately discounted. 
For a debtor country in such a model, a fall in the world interest rate will 
induce income and substitution effects, which will result in a "consumption boom" 
and a widening in the current account deficit. For a debtor nation, a declining 
interest rate reduces the present value of its debt, which is a positive income effect. 
The substitution effect is that since borrowing is now cheaper, consumption should 
rise. These effects could become even stronger if the country was initially credit 
rationed in international capital markets, or if the debt is variable rate. 
Furthermore, had the Fisherian model included endogenous determination of 
investment, then the interest rate shock could also translate to a rise in investment. 
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Together with the lower savings rate (the converse of higher consumption discussed 
above), this implies a further widening of the current account deficit. Since increases 
in consumption and investment spending occur for both traded and nontraded goods, 
and since the latter are in more limited supply than the former, then the rise in demand 
will result in an increase in the relative price of nontraded goods-which is another 
way of stating that the real exchange rate appreciates. 
An alternate and complementary theoretical approach focuses on the monetary 
economy, as in the model of Calvo and Vegh (1993). In this case, similar 
implications arise from a temporary decline in the international nominal interest rate. 
Such a decline in interest rate could happen for reasons outside the control of the 
capital-importing country. Or it could happen because internal developments such 
as the implementation of an exchange rate-based inflation stabilization program. 
As shown by Calvo and Vegh, if the policy lacks credibility, a discrepancy arises 
between the current nominal interest rate and its expected higher levels in the 
future. In such a case, the macroeconomic outcome mimics the case of a temporary 
decline in international interest rates. This sort of shock also leads to a rise in 
consumption, an increase in the current account deficit, and a real exchange rate 
appreciation-much as in the Fisher-type framework. The model also predicts an 
increase in real money balances, both because it is cheaper to hold money, at least 
for the present, and because consumption and economic activity is increasing. 
In any of these models, the exchange rate regime will affect the monetary 
consequences of the capital inflows. In most models, consumption and investment 
booms will be accompanied by a rise in money demand. In a small open economy 
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operating under a free float, capital inflows will be associated with a nominal 
exchange rate appreciation and no change in either reserves or the monetary aggregates. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, money market equilibrium will be 
achieved via an accumulation of international reserves at the central bank and a 
rise in the money supply. For intermediate cases, the degree of monetary expansion 
following a rise in capital inflows will be smaller to the extent that the inflows are 
sterilized, or that the nominal exchange rate is allowed to appreciate. 
Thus, standard open economy models suggest that a surge in capital inflows is 
likely to be accompanied by a rise in consumption and investment, an increase in 
real money balances and foreign exchange reserves, a real exchange rate appreciation, 
and a widening in the current account deficit. Including other assets in the 
analysis is likely to indicate that rising inflows would be associated with higher equity 
and real estate prices. These predicted effects are indeed broadly consistent with 
what was actually observed in the first half of the 1990s in most of the capital importing 
countries. 
 
Policy Management of Capital Inflows 
Capital inflows to developing countries have often been seen as beneficial by 
all parties. For the capital-rich developed economies, such investments appear a 
desirable way of diversifying risk and investing in productive assets that will, in a 
few decades, fund the retirement of the baby-boom generation. For the relatively 
capital-poor developing countries, the flows can fund investment and promote economic 
growth. Perhaps just as valuable for a developing country, foreign investment 
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can also come with experienced management, new technology and useful business 
skills. It is easy to draw up economic models where developing countries run continual 
but sustainable current account deficits, and markets will handle the requisite 
capital flows with little need for government intervention. The main policy 
decisions involve the interaction between the capital flows, exchange rates, monetary 
policy and other policy objectives (like inflation). For example, imagine a 
country that wishes to increase its money supply. This might occur because of 
an increased money demand, which in turn could be the result of a successful 
stabilization program or a rise in economic growth. In such a case, rapid monetary 
growth would not be inflationary, and the government might decide simply 
to create domestic currency to accommodate the rise in money demand, allow 
foreign investors to purchase that currency in exchange rate markets, and then 
invest it. This would be called "monetizing" the capital flow. Another possibility 
would simply be to let foreign investors trade for your domestic currency in 
exchange rate markets. 
At least in theory, a laissez-faire attitude toward capital flows may work perfectly 
well. But in reality, judging from the fact that many countries have tried to exercise 
some control over such inflows or their less-desirable side effects, there is apparently 
a perceived cost to a strategy of no intervention. 
Several possible consequences of capital inflows are of special concern to 
policymakers. The capital inflows can lead to inflationary pressures, especially 
when they are monetized. Since an inflow of capital also implies a higher demand 
for a nation's currency, it often means an appreciating exchange rate, 
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which may widen the trade deficit to uncomfortable levels. If a nation's banking 
system has difficulty handling the capital flows, there is some risk of financial 
destabilization and even banking crises. Overall, in a world of high capital 
mobility, where capital inflows can depart just as rapidly as they arrived, there 
is a genuine risk that their effects on inflation, the exchange rate and the 
financial sector can lead to severe macroeconomic instability. The experience 
of Mexico in the aftermath of December 1994 is a vivid illustration of these 
potential problems and especially of the sharp contraction in economic activity 
that can follow sudden reversals of capital flows. Such concerns have often led 
the authorities to react to the inflows by implementing a variety of policy 
measures. 
Monetary Policy: Sterilization and Regulation 
Sterilization has been, by far, the most popular policy response to capital inflows 
in both Latin America and Asia. This policy aims at insulating the money 
supply and/or the exchange rate from the effect of the capital inflows; the intent 
is to mitigate inflationary pressures, the real exchange rate appreciation, and avoid 
the loss of control over the domestic money stock. 5 However, it is not clear that this 
policy can provide a lasting solution, and it can be costly. Presumably, funds are being 
attracted into the country by the promise of higher expected interest rates. But if the 
capital inflow is sterilized, this will prevent the interest rate differential from narrowing, 
and may thus induce further capital inflows. In addition, since sterilization involves 
increasing the number of domestic bonds to offset the currency inflow, it results in an 
                                                 
5 Sterilization would not be needed if domestic agents borrow abroad to finance purchases of imported 
goods, since in this case the inflows are not intermediated through the domestic financial system. 
 
 20
increase in public debt. Eventually, this policy could result in a rise in public debt so 
large as to undermine the credibility of policymakers, especially if the public begins 
expecting a partial repudiation of the debt-expectations that may well halt the inflows 
altogether (Calvo, 1991; Frankel, 1993b). 
Other costs are associated with sterilized intervention. If the central bank 
were simply to provide its own currency for purposes of foreign exchange without 
sterilization, it would allow the domestic money supply to increase. The 
central bank would also end up holding foreign currency, which it could invest 
in the bonds of the foreign country. However, after selling domestic bonds to 
sterilize the currency inflow, the central hank must then pay interest on those 
bonds. To the extent that the interest rate on domestic bonds is higher than 
that on foreign exchange reserves (which is the case for most developing countries), 
this entails costs. 6 Annual estimates of these costs in Latin American 
countries range from 0.25 to 0.80 percent of GDP (Kiguel and Leiderman, 
1994). 
Sterilization can take other forms. For example, instead of reducing the money 
supply by selling bonds, the central bank could raise bank reserve requirements or 
increase the discount rate. Such steps may be especially relevant in those countries 
where capital inflows have taken the form of marked increases in local bank accounts. 
An increase in reserve requirements (an option used by Chile and Malaysia) 
lowers the capacity of banks to lend without the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilization. 
The regulatory side of monetary policy-that is, bank regulation and supervision can 
                                                 
6  Most central banks hold a substantial portion of their foreign exchange reserves as U.S. Treasury bills, 
which were yielding relatively low returns throughout most of the early 1990s. 
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also help, especially in dealing with the risk of macroeconomic destabilization. 
For example, regulations that limit the exposure of banks to the volatility in equity 
and real estate markets, as well as establishing risk-based capital requirements, 
would be especially timely. 
However, many of these policies are not without their costs. They may promote 
"disintermediation," which refers to new institutions that develop to bypass these 
regulations. Moreover, greater controls on banks amount to a reversal of the underlying 
trends of financial liberalization in developing countries. 
Controlling Capital Inflows and Liberalizing Capital Outflows 
Various countries, such as Chile and Colombia, have imposed taxes on short term 
borrowing abroad with the intent of discouraging inflows that are thought to 
be particularly speculative. For example, Chile chose to tax inflows (in effect) by 
imposing a reserve requirement on international loans intermediated through the 
banking system. The main disadvantage of such a requirement is that capital flows 
nlay eventually be rerouted through other channels-for example, the overinvoicing 
of imports and under-invoicing of exports-which may reduce the authorities' 
control on the financial system. Less explicit capital controls have taken 
the form of "prudential regulation," usually of the domestic banking system. Countries 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have sought to curb 
banks' offshore borrowing (a capital inflow) or their foreign exchange exposure 
by imposing limits on these or tightening existing regulations. 
Another response has been to soften the domestic impact of capital inflows by 
lowering the institutional barriers to capital outflows. However, as shown by Laban 
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and Larrain (1994), to the extent that lifting restrictions on capital outflows is 
viewed as a positive step toward economic liberalization, it may increase the confidence 
of foreign investors and thus may stimulate capital inflows. 
Fiscal Policy 
As noted earlier, some countries reacted to the surge in capital inflows by 
tightening fiscal policy, usually via a cut in public expenditures. To the extent that 
nontradable goods often represent a sizable share of government expenditure, cutting 
government spending will reduce the demand for nontradables relative to the 
demand for tradable goods. This step makes nontradables able to buy less of the 
goods traded on world markets-which effectively means limiting the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. 7 
However, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited in this situation. Changes 
in legislation and sensitive political actions usually cannot be undertaken on short 
notice, which would often be needed to offset the effects of the capital inflows. 
Furthermore, optimal fiscal policy considerations suggest that taxes and expenditures 
be set to reflect long-term goals, rather than in response to what can be 
excessively volatile fluctuations in international capital markets. 
Exchange Rate Policy 
A final option for a capital-importing country is to let the nominal exchange 
rate appreciate in response to capital inflows. The main advantage of allowing 
greater exchange rate flexibility is that the appreciation in the real exchange rate 
                                                 
7  Interestingly enough, the effect of such a fiscal tightening is likely to be stronger if the cut in 
expenditures is perceived to be ternporaly. If it is seen as permanent, individuals may perceive a rise in 
lifetime disposable income and increase their borrowing to finance higher spending-thus partially offsetting 
the effect of the cut in public expenditure. 
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is likely to occur through a change in the nominal exchange rate and not through 
higher inflation. Moreover, exchange rate flexibility might strengthen the degree 
of autonomy of domestic monetary policy precisely when central bank's function 
as "lender of last resort" might be needed-for example, during a temporary sub 
sequent reversal of capital inflows. 
A disadvantage of a pure float is that it may be associated with high volatility 
in the real exchange rate. Massive and rapid capital inflows may induce such a steep 
and rapid exchange rate appreciation that it may damage the competitiveness of 
strategic sectors for economic growth, like nontraditional exports. It is even possible 
that a sufficiently large real exchange rate appreciation, in a model with sunk costs, 
can induce hysteresis in the trade balance and thereby alter the steady-state real 
exchange rate (Baldwin and Lyons, 1994). 
To reduce the risk of excessive fluctuations in the real exchange rate, several 
countries have adopted crawling exchange rate bands, which can be seen as an 
intermediate case between fixed and flexible exchange rates. In 1994, for example, 
Colombia joined Chile and Mexico in adopting a preannounced crawling exchange 
rate band. 8 The mere existence of these bands did not eliminate pressures on the 
exchange rate regime; in fact, faced with persistent capital inflows, Chile and Colombia 
had to realign their bands in 1994 by officially appreciating their central 
parity exchange rates. As the Argentine case highlights, this tendency toward partial 
flexibility has not been across the board. Yet in many developing countries, there 
                                                 
8 For analysis of exchange rate bands in Chile, Israel and Mexico, see Helpman, Leiderman and Bufrnan 
(1994). While Mexico's band became wider over time, there was considerable intervention within the band. 
Prior to March 1994 and the assassination of Mexican presidential candidate Colosio, the exchange rate 
was virtually fixed. 
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have been theoretical and practical arguments for moving to a more flexible 
exchange rate arrangement. Greater exchange rate flexibility, by introducing uncertainty, 
could discourage speculative short-term, crossborder flows. Further, increased 
exchange rate flexibility grants the monetary authorities a greater degree 
of autonomy in the conduct of domestic monetary policy and permits them to 
exercise more control over the monetary aggregates. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Although strong fiscal and monetary fundamentals are essential for a sound 
management of capital inflows, other policy choices for small open economies facing 
a surge in capital inflows are limited. All in all, in a world of high capital mobility 
it is not clear to what extent these policies are capable of significantly reducing a 
country's vulnerability in the event that capital flows reverse themselves. Moreover, 
most of the policies that could be implemented to counteract the effects of the 
flows also entail costs or their effectiveness is limited to relatively short periods of 
time. However, there are some important lessons in macroeconomic management 
that emerge from the surge of capital inflows to Asia and Latin America in the first 
half of the 1990s. 
Gauging by their economic performance and their ability to withstand the 
adverse side effects of the Mexican crisis, the countries that have been the most 
successful in managing capital flows (for example, Chile and Malaysia) have 
implemented a comprehensive policy package and not relied on a single instrument. At 
the outset of the surge in inflows, these countries reacted by treating the inflows as 
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temporary and resisted a nominal exchange rate appreciation; the foreign 
exchange intervention was mostly sterilized. As the inflows persisted, sterilization 
efforts were scaled back and the domestic currency was allowed to appreciate. To 
moderate the extent of the real appreciation and prevent the economy from overheating, 
fiscal policy was tightened. To moderate the volume of the inflows and 
lengthen their maturities, exchange rate flexibility was increased and measures to 
curb inflows were implemented. 
A less productive policy mix has consisted of persistent sterilized intervention 
(which keeps short-term interest rates comparatively high), heavy intervention in 
the foreign exchange market (which results in little short-run exchange rate uncertainty) 
and no controls on short-term capital movements. All of these policies 
have tended to provide especially strong incentives for short-term capital inflows. 
To a large extent, this policy mix characterized the Mexican experience through 
most of the early 1990s. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that the severity 
of the Mexican crisis would have been lessened had the inflows (which became 
outflows) been smaller, had their maturity been longer and had the inflows been 
accompanied by a much smaller decline in domestic saving than that actually 
observed. 
The surge of capital inflows to Asia and Latin America in the first half of the 
1990s is an enormous and multidirrlensional natural experiment, one that economists 
will be studying for years to come. Let us now tun1 to a few questions this 
research could address. For example, theoretical models are clear in their predictions for 
the real exchange rate in response to an increase in capital inflows. However, despite 
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capital flows of similar orders of magnitudes and often common policy responses, the 
real exchange rate has shown a stronger tendency for appreciation in Latin America 
than in Asia. Future research might try to account for these differences. 
In the last two decades, several Latin American stock markets experienced a 
boom-bust cycle of proportions not seen in industrial countries in the post-World 
War I1 period. These events provide an ideal testing ground for "bubbles" hypotheses 
and may help understand asset price behavior in emerging markets. 
Relatively little is known about how international capital flows are intermediated. 
Such research might help investigate the potential links between rising international 
portfolio flows and equity market volatility. Another relatively unexplored 
topic is the role of international organizations, and foreign governments, in providing 
support at times of capital outflow pressures. As is evident in the resolution 
of the recent currency crisis in Mexico, a bailout package that provided sizable 
international support served to avoid default and promote confidence in the domestic 
economy. A key question in this context is how to design feasible international 
lender of last resort facilities that do not pose moral hazard problems for the 
policies of individual countries. 
More broadly, the mix and magnitude of the economic risks confronting 
developing countries do not yet seem to be well understood. Consider the various 
risks for developing nations inherent in the integration of world capital markets, 
the volatility of international commodity prices, changes in world interest rates and 
how these countries are affected by the developments and policies in the industrial 
countries. Which of these factors poses the largest risks in the remainder of the 
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1990s? How are the risks interrelated? How are policies to deal with the risks related? 
In what measure are the developing countries prepared to deal with such shocks? 
Applied research in these areas will have to provide better measures of credibility 
and time-varying risk. This task is a difficult one. As discussed in this paper, capital 
inflows may provide ambiguous signals to market participants. Inflows may reflect 
renewed confidence about favorable medium- and long-term investment opportunities 
in the receiving country. Alternatively, capital may pour in for purely speculative 
purposes to a country where the lack of credibility in government policies 
leads to high return on domestic financial assets. Attempting to accomplish this 
task is essential to a better understanding of the forces driving the cycles in foreign 
lending to developing countries, and to gauging the vulnerability of developing 
countries to a reversal of such capital flows. 
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